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ANOTHER LOOK AT STRICT LIABILITY: THE
EFFECT ON CONTRIBUTION AMONG
TORTFEASORS

Today thirty-one states' apply the principle of strict liability
to the law of products liability. But conflict between strict liability and some of the long established doctrines of tort law has accompanied the adoption of this principle. One such conflict is with
negligence, the doctrine strict liability was designed to replace in
the field of products liability. Contribution among tortfeasors is a
corollary of negligence and like negligence its underlying policies
and rationale clash with those underlying strict liability. This conflict is clearly illustrated when considering whether a right of contribution exists between a tortfeasor strictly liable and a tortfeasor
negligently liable.
The only cases arising under Pennsylvania law and involving
this issue have been decided in the federal courts. 2 Since their jurisdiction was that of diversity and as yet none of the Pennsylvania
appellate courts have been faced with this issue, these federal
courts based their decisions on predictions as to how the Pennsylvania courts would hold if confronted with the same issue. One
result of this void in Pennsylvania case law was a conflict among the
holdings of the federal district courts confronted with this issue.
As a consequence, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit in Chamberlain v. Carborundum Co. resolved this dispar-

ity by affirming the existence of the right of contribution between
one strictly liable and one negligently liable.
In an attempt to clarify this area of the law, this Comment first
examines Pennsylvania's approach to and construction of the right
of contribution among tortfeasors. Thereafter it explores the
1. For a list of these jurisdictions, see Reitz and Seabolt, Warranties
and Product Liability: Who Can Sue and Where?, 46 TEmp. L.Q. 527, 531
(1973). In Webb v. Zern, 422 Pa. 424, 220 A.2d 853 (1966), Pennsylvania

adopted strict liability as enunciated at section 402A of the
(Sscoia) OF TORTS.

RESTATEMENT

2. Chamberlain v. Carborundum Co., 495 F.2d 31 (3d Cir. 1973);
Rhoads v. Ford Motor Co., 374 F. Supp. 1317 (W.D. Pa. 1974); W.D. Rubright
Co. v. International Harvester Co., 358 F. Supp. 1388 (W.D. Pa. 1973); Walters v. Hiab Hydraulics, Inc., 356 F. Supp. 1000 (M.D. Pa. 1973); Chamberlain v. Carborundum Co., Civil No. 68-1235 (W.D. Pa., May 19, 1972); Fenton v. McCrory Corp., 47 F.R.D. 260 (W.D. Pa. 1969) ("There is no authority
in Pennsylvania on this point, and as far as we can determine no judicial
construction or commentary elsewhere.").
3. 485 F.2d 31 (3d Cir. 1973).

conflict between the policies and rationale underlying Pennsylvania's interpretation of strict liability and those underlying contribution. Finally, with this discussion as background, this Comment analyzes those federal court decisions which have considered
the issue of whether a right of contribution exists between one liable in strict liability and one liable in negligence.
I.

CONTRIBUTIONr

For a long time, the great majority of American jurisdictions
followed a common law principle that prohibited contribution
among joint tortfeasors. 4 The rationale upon which this rule was
established was that tortfeasors as wrongdoers do not deserve the
aid of the judicial system in distributing the injured party's loss
among those responsible for causing the loss. 5 In 1928 the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania in Goldman v. Mitchell-Fletcher Co.6 discontinued its concurrence 7 with the majority rule and held that contribution was available among negligent tortfeasors. This decision
was incorporated in 1939 by the state legislature into a statute providing for contribution." Moreover, with the adoption of the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act 9 in 1951, Pennsylvania
strengthened its commitment to the doctrine of contribution.
A.

Background to Contribution

As a foundation to the discussion of the Pennsylvania appellate
courts' viewpoint toward contribution, it is necessary to briefly discuss: (1) the definition of a joint tortfeasor; (2) the distinction between contribution and indemnity; and (3) the procedural enforcement of the right of contribution in Pennsylvania.
The question of contribution arises primarily among joint tortfeasors, but confusion surrounds the definition of a joint tortfeasor.
Section 1 of Pennsylvania's Uniform Act defines joint tortfeasors
as "two or more persons jointly or severally liable in tort for the
same injury to persons or property." 10 Those persons "jointly or
severally liable in tort" have been divided into three categories: 1'
persons who knowingly join in the performance of a tortious act;
4. Leflar, Contribution and Indemnity Between Tortfeasors, 81 U. PA.
L. REV. 130 (1932).
5. Id. at 132.
6. 292 Pa. 354, 141 A. 231 (1928).
7. See, e.g., Oakdale Borough v. Gamble, 201 Pa. 289, 50 A. 971

(1902); Turton v. Powelton Elec. Co., 185 Pa. 406, 39 A. 1053 (1898); Boyer

v. Bolender, 129 Pa. 324, 18 A. 127 (1889); Seither v. Phila. Trans. Co;, 125
Pa. 397, 17 A. 338 (1889).
8. Act of June 24, 1939, P.L. 1075 (repealed 1951).
9. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 2082-89 (1967) [hereinafter referred to

as Pennsylvania's Uniform Act].
10.

Id. § 2082.

See 1 HARPER AND JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 10.1 (1956); 2B FRUMER, BENOIT AND FRIEDMAN, PERSONAL INJURY Contribution § 1.01 [1] (1967).
11.
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persons who fail to perform a common duty to the plaintiff; and
persons whose separate and independent acts concur to produce the
plaintiff's injury.' 2 Contribution arises almost entirely in situations falling within the third category.
Contribution and indemnity, although similar because both
are remedies used to allocate damages among those jointly liable,
are distinguishable in several ways. Indemnity, unlike contribution, has always been recognized in all jurisdictions. 13 However, a
more significant difference is demonstrated by their different methods of loss distribution: in contribution each tortfeasor is required
to pay his proportionate share while in indemnity the entire loss is
shifted from the tortfeasor compelled to pay it to another who
should bear the loss. Indemnity is premised on principles of contract, express or implied, and may arise by operation of law. 14
Contribution, on the other hand, reflects a judicial disposition of
fairness and equity as displayed by the apportionment of liability
among those persons whose tortious conduct caused another's injury.15
In the products liability field there are far more actions for indemnity than for contribution. Most of these actions for indemnity
arise between members of the chain of distribution of the defective
12. For the third category it is not significant that the defendants' acts

were not simultaneous but successive. E.g., Duckworth v. Ford Motor Co.,
320 F.2d 130 (3d Cir. 1963).

13. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 886B, Comment a (Tent. Draft
No. 18, 1972).
14. E.g., McFall v. Campaigne Maritime Belge, 304 N.Y. 314, 328, 107
N.E.2d 463, 471 (1952).
15. E.g., Parker v. Rodgers, 125 Pa. Super. 48, 51, 189 A. 693, 695
(1937).
In Builders Supply Co. v. McCabe, 366 Pa. 322, 77 A.2d 368 (1951), Justice Stern, while establishing the requisites to the right of indemnity, also
distinguished indemnity from contribution in the following passages which
are today widely quoted in decisions involving indemnity and contribution.
There is, of course, a fundamental difference between indemnity
and contribution. The right to indemnity rests upon a difference
between the primary and secondary liability of two persons each
of whom is made responsible by the law to an injured party.
Id. at 325, 77 A.2d at 370.
[S]econdary as distinguished from primary liability rests upon a
fault that is imputed or constructive only, being based on some legal relation between the parties, or arising from some positive rule
of common or statutory law or because of a failure to discover or
correct a defect or remedy a dangerous condition caused by the act
of the one primarily responsible. In the case of concurrent or joint
tortfeasors, having no legal relation to one another, each of them
owing the same duty to the injured, and involved in an accident
in which the injury occurs, there is a complete unanimity among
authorities everywhere that no right of indemnity exists on behalf
of either against the other. ...
Id. at 328, 77 A.2d at 371.

product.1 6 These cases usually involve the owner or distributor,
held liable for an injury as a matter of law (such as strict liability)
or in contract (such as warranty), proceeding against the previous
seller or manufacturer who was primarily responsible for the defect in the product which caused the injury. 17
Finally, three procedural routes exist from which a joint
tortfeasor can choose to enforce his right of contribution. First, if
the injured person brings an action against only one of the joint
tortfeasors, that defendant can join or implead the other tortfeasor
as an additional or third-party defendant in the same action. 1'8
Second, a joint tortfeasor who does not implead the other tortfeasor
in the original action but instead pays more than his pro rata share
of the judgment recovered against him may bring a separate action
for contribution against the other tortfeasor. 19 Third, if one tortfeasor settles with the injured person and pays more than his pro
rata share of the common liability, he may bring an independent
action for contribution against the other joint tortfeasor. 20
B.

Uniform ContributionAmong TortfeasorsAct

Even though thirty-five states have divorced themselves from
the common law antipathy to contribution among tortfeasors, the
form of contribution permitted varies greatly from state to state.
Nine states have allowed contribution, without the aid of legislation,
through judicial mandate.2 1 Thirteen states 22 have adopted one of
the two Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Acts 2 1-both of
24
which are recognized as allowing the broadest form of contribution.
The remaining thirteen states have varying forms of legislation on
16. 3 FURMER AND FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY Indemnity § 44.02[2]
(1973).
17. E.g., McCrory Corp. v. Girard Rubber Corp., 225 Pa. Super. 45, 307
A.2d 435 (1973).

18. PA. R. Civ. P. 2252.
19. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2084 (1967).
20. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2083 (1967). In these independent actions, joint liability must still be established. See, e.g., W.D. Rubright Co.
v. International Harvester Co., 358 F. Supp. 1388 (W.D. Pa. 1973). If the
independent action arises from a settlement agreement, then the reasonable-

ness of the settlement must be shown prior to the awarding of contribution.
Id.
21. See Allen, Joint Tortfeasors-A Case for Unlimited Contribution,
43 Miss. L.J. 50, 55 (1972).
22. First Uniform Act: Arkansas, Delaware, Hawaii, Maryland, New
Mexico, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island and South Dakota. Second Uniform
Act: Arizona, Massachusetts, North Carolina, North Dakota and Tennessee.
23. In 1939 the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws approved the UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT,
9 U.L.A. 233 (1957). In 1955 the Conference approved a revision of this
act: UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG ToRTFAsoRs ACT, 9 U.L.A. 127 (Supp.
1967).
24.

2B FRUMER, BENOIX AND FRIEDMAN, PERSONAL INJURY Contribution

§ 1.03[1] (1967).
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25
contribution among joint tortfeasors.
In 1951 Pennsylvania
26
Act.
Uniform
first
the
adopted
Both Uniform Acts provide for the right of contribution

"whether or not judgment has been recovered against all or some"
of the tortfeasors. 27 The draftsmen of the Uniform Acts included
this phrase to make clear that a joint judgment is not a condition
precedent to the right to contribution as it is in some states. 28 By
requiring the rendering of a joint judgment as a prerequisite to the
right of contribution, the injured plaintiff is permitted to control
the distribution of his loss.
Under the Mississippi contribution statute, 29 for example, a
defendant may not bring in as additional defendants other joint
tortfeasors who had not been made parties to the action by the
plaintiff. By refusing to file suit against one or more tortfeasors,
even though a trial would have proven them equally liable, the
plaintiff may receive complete compensaton from the tortfeasor
whom he wishes to hold liable and also confer immunity from contribution upon those tortfeasors not made parties. The tortfeasor
held liable for the entire liability may not sue the other non-party
tortfeasors for contribution because there has been no judgment
against them. Only when all the tortfeasors are sued and a judgment has been recovered jointly against them and one pays more
than his share of the judgment may a suit be brought for contribution from the other co-defendants.
The requirement of a joint judgment before the right of contribution may be asserted defeats the function of contribution, which
is to distribute the injured party's loss among those responsible.
Although many states have moved away from the common law
prohibition against the right of contribution, differences still remain regarding the form of contribution adopted by these states.
These procedural requisites for contribution affect the substantive
right to contribution and cause the form of contribution to be more
restrictive in some states than others.

25.

For the names of these states, see Allen, Joint Tortfeasors-A Case

for Unlimited Contribution,43 Miss. L.J. 50, 55 n.19 (1972).
26.
27.
28.

See note 9 and accompanying text supra.
9 U.L.A. 233 § 1 (1957); 9 U.L.A. 127 § 1 (Supp. 1967).
9 U.L.A. 233 § 1 (1957), Commissioners' Note. E.g., Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 537.060 (1949); TEx. REv. CIV. STAT. A!N. art. 2212 (1964); W. VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 55-7, 12 -13 (1966).
29.

MISS. CODE ANN. § 335.5 (1956).

C. Pennsylvania's Constructionof the Uniform Contribution
Among Tortfeasors Act
The doctrine of contribution in Pennsylvania is deeply rooted
in the principles of equity, natural justice and good conscience. 30
In Parker v. Rodgers,31 Judge Parker said this about the foundational principles of contribution:
The doctrine of contribution rests on the principle that,
when the parties stand in aequali jure, the law requires
equality, which is equity, and one of them shall not
be ob2
liged to bear a common burden in ease of the restY

The Pennsylvania courts have adhered consistently to these
principles in interpreting Pennsylvania's Uniform Act. They have
declared that the Uniform Act "was designed to effectuate a just result for all parties involved"3 3 and because "equity is the keynote
of the doctrine of contribution, the Act of 1951 must be examined
with equity in mind." 4
In cases involving contribution the Pennsylvania courts have
developed a unique approach. While concentrating more on the
relationship between the tortfeasors, they disregard the tort which
gave rise to the plaintiff's injury. This approach is manifested in
Puller v. Puller,3 1 where the court stated that contribution is not a
recovery for the tort but instead is the enforcement of the equitable duty between the tortfeasors to share the loss for the wrong
done.36 When faced with situations in which the policies underlying the tort inflicted upon the plaintiff conflict with the policies
underlying contribution, the Pennsylvania courts have given great
weight to the equitable nature of contribution. This approach to
contribution is best exemplified by an examination of Pennsylvania's
application of a concept called "common liability" to its Uniform Act
as compared with other states' treatment of this concept.
In most states before the right to contribution may be asserted
there must be a common legal liability on the part of the tortfeasors
toward the injured person. 7 For common liability to exist, the
30. See, e.g., Panichella v. Pennsylvania R.R., 167 F. Supp. 345 (W.D.
Pa. 1958); Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. v. Car & General Ins. Corp.,
152 F. Supp. 477 (E.D. Pa. 1957); Swartz v. Sunderland, 403 Pa. 222, 169
A.2d 289 (1961); Brown v. Dickey, 397 Pa. 454, 155 A.2d 836 (1959); In re
Mellon's Estate, 347 Pa. 454, 32 A.2d 749 (1943); Stark v. Posh Constr. Co.,

192 Pa. Super. 409, 162 A.2d 9 (1960); Fisher v. Diehl, 156 Pa. Super. 476,
40 A.2d 912 (1945).
31. 125 Pa. Super. 48, 189 A. 693 (1937).
32. Id. at 51, 189 A. at 695.
33. Swartz v. Sunderland, 403 Pa. 222, 225, 169 A.2d 289, 291 (1961).
34. Mong v. Hershberger, 200 Pa. Super. 68, 72, 186 A.2d 427, 429
(1962).
35. 380 Pa.219, 110 A.2d 175(1955).
38. Id. at 221, 110 A.2d at 177.
37. See cases listed at 19 A.L.R.2d 1003 (1951). For a more detailed
discussion see Note, Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors When One Tortfeasor Enjoys a Special Defense Against Action By the Injured Party, 52
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plaintiff must have been able to assert a cause of action against the
tortfeasor from whom contribution is sought by the defendant.
When one of the tortfeasors has at the time of the tort a personal
defense, such as an immunity, against the injured party which
prevents the possibility of personal legal liability, common liability
is impossible.3 8 The joint tortfeasor who does not enjoy such a defense, even though he is no more culpable than the tortfeasor with
the special defense, must pay the plaintiff's entire loss. The underlying purpose of contribution, which is to have the wrongdoers
share the financial burden of their wrong, is stifled if the common
liability requirement is not fulfilled.
For contribution in Pennsylvania, there is no need for common
liability and the Uniform Act is construed accordingly. In Fisher v.
Diehl, s9 a decision under the 1939 Pennsylvania contribution statute, 40 the Superior Court of Pennsylvania held that the defendant
could assert a right of contribution against the husband of the plaintiff. 41 In holding that interspousal immunity would not prevent a
defendant from asserting the right of contribution, the superior
court caused Pennsylvania to be the first state to reject the requirement of common liability.
In Fisher, the plaintiff, a passenger in an automobile driven
by her husband, was injured in an accident in which both her husband and the other driver were negligent. When the other driver
sought to join the husband as an additional defendant in a suit
brought against him by the wife, the husband protested, claiming
that to allow this joinder would be contrary to the policy underpinnings of interspousal immunity. After weighing the conflicting
policies of interspousal immunity and contribution, the court concluded:
The legal unity of husband and wife and the preservation of domestic peace and felicity between them are desirable things to maintain where they do not produce injustice
CoRmLL L.Q. 407 (1967).
38. In the case of common law joint tortfeasors, the overwhelming
weight of authority holds to the view that where the concurring
negligence of the party from whom contribution is sought gives the
injured party no cause of action against him, the claimant cannot
recover contribution, even though such concurring negligence was
a proximate cause of the injury.
Panichella v. Pennsylvania, 167 F. Supp. 345, 351 (W.D. Pa. 1958).
39. 156 Pa. Super. 476, 40 A.2d 912 (1945).
40. See note 8 supra.
41. After the adoption of the Uniform Act, the holding of Fisher v.
Diehl, 156 Pa. Super. 476, 40 A.2d 912 (1945) was applied by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to the Uniform Act in Puller v. Puller, 380 Pa. 219,
110 A.2d 175 (1955), another interspousal immunity case.

to the wife and where they do not inflict injustice
upon
42
outsiders and deprive them of their legal rights.
We are of opinion that the bringing in [of the husband]
as an additional defendant in the action .. . was in the

interest of right and justice, and that to have refused to
have done so would have been an injustice to the original
defendant .... 43
Only three other states 44 have adopted this minority position
and of these three states only one 45 has the first Uniform Act as its
statutory form of contribution. But Pennsylvania's liberal construction of the Uniform Act was subsequently rejected by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in their
revision of the Uniform Act in 1955. In the comment to Section 1 of
the second Uniform Act, the Commissioners explained that "[t] he
language used has been adequate to exclude cases where the person
from whom contribution is sought was not liable to the injured
person. Thus where the potential contributor is the spouse of the
injured person [sic].""4 As a result, the five states 47 that have
adopted the second Uniform Act have followed the majority rule
requiring common liability.
Workmen's compensation law presents another special defense
which has been interpreted by the overwhelming majority of states
as precluding the establishment of the common liability requirement.48 When an employee's injury is caused by a third party
outside of the employment relationship, the employee is permitted
to pursue an action at common law against the third party. The difficulty arises when the employee's injury is a result of the joint
wrongdoing of the employer and the third party. If the employee
brings an action against the third party, may the third party join
the employer to enforce his right of contribution? Of the states
which permit contribution, all but Pennsylvania hold that because
the employee may not sue the employer, the common liability requirement is not met and there is no right to contribution.
As early as 1940 in Maio v. Fahs,'49 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania permitted a negligent automobile driver to join as a
joint tortfeasor the decedent's employer in a suit by the employee's widow against the negligent driver for purposes of contribu42. Fisher v. Diehl, 156 Pa. Super. 476, 484, 40 A.2d 912, 917 (1945).
43. Id. at 487, 40 A.2d at 918.
44. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 247 La. 645, 174 So. 2d 122
(1965); Bedell v. Reagan, 159 Me. 292, 192 A.2d 24 (1963); Zarrella v. Miller,
100 R.I. 545, 217 A.2d 673 (1966).
45. Rhode Island.
46. 9 U.L.A. 127 § 1 (Supp. 1967), Commissioners' Note.
47. See note 22 supra for a list of these states.
48. For a more detailed discussion see Note, Workmen's Compensation
Third Party Tort-FeasorActions, 16 DRAKE L. REv. 93 (1967); Note, Contribution and Indemnity: The Effect of Workmen's Compensation Acts, 42
VA. L. REv. (1956).
49. 339 Pa. 180, 14 A.2d 105 (1940).
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tion. 50 Again the court's approach was to weigh the equitable policy of contribution against the policy of workmen's compensation
law which substitutes a statutory remedy for common law negligence to ensure the injured employee compensation. The decision
was a compromise between the two conflicting policies: the right
of contribution was permitted against the employer but the employer's amount of contribution was limited to the extent of his
liability to the employee under the workmen's compensation act.
Since the employer's liability is limited, a rule allowing full contribution would allow an injured employee to recover indirectly from
his employer for injuries for which the employer was not liable under the workmen's compensation law. On the other hand, this compromise does not force the third party to bear the entire burden of
loss merely because the other tortfeasor happened to be the injured
party's employer.
Another factor that has also been recognized as limiting the
right of contribution is the type of tortfeasor seeking contribution.
This has arisen when an intentional or wilful and wanton tortfeasor
defendant seeks contribution. The overwhelming majority of states
that have been faced with this issue, 51 the second Uniform Act 52
and section 886A(3) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (Tentative
Draft)5 3 all deny the right of contribution to intentional and willful
and wanton tortfeasors.
In Goldman v. Mitchell-Fletcher Co.,54 in addition to recognizing the right of contribution in Pennsylvania, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court said that contribution would not be extended to an
intentional wrongdoer. However, the issue again arises in view of
50. This was a decision also rendered under the 1939 Pennsylvania
contribution statute (see note 8 supra) but was later applied under the Uniform Act in Brown v. Dickey, 397 Pa. 454, 155 A.2d 836 (1959).
51. See, e.g., Wiener v. United Airlines, 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir. 1964);
Knell v. Feltman, 174 F.2d 662 (D.C. Cir. 1949); Turner v. Kirkwood, 49
F.2d 590 (10th Cir. 1931); Augustus v. Bean, 56 Cal. 2d 270, 363 P.2d 983,
14 Cal. Rptr. 641 (1961); Best v. Yerkes, 247 Iowa 800, 77 N.W.2d 23 (1956);
Consolidated Coach Corp. v. Burge, 245 Ky. 631, 54 S.W.2d 16 (1932); Hobbs
v. Hurley, 117 Me. 449, 104 A. 815 (1918); Hardware Mut. Cas. Co. v. Danberry, 234 Minn. 391, 48 N.W.2d 567 (1951); Davis v. Broad St. Garage, 191
Tenn. 320, 232 S.W.2d 355 (1950); Norfolk Southern R.R. v. Gretakis, 162
Va. 597, 174 S.E. 841 (1934); Jacobs v. General Accident Fire & Life Assur.
Corp., 14 Wis. 2d 1, 109 N.W.2d 462 (1961). Contra, Judson v. Peoples Bank
& Trust Co. of Westfield, 17 N.J. 67, 110 A.2d 24 (1954).
52. "There is no right of contribution in favor of any tortfeasor who
has intentionally [wilfully and wantonly] caused or contributed to the injury or wrongful death." 9 U.L.A. 127 § 1 (c) (Supp. 1967).
53. "There is no right of contribution in favor of any tortfeasor who
has intentionally or recklessly caused the harm." RESTATEMENT (SEcoND)
OF TORTS § 886A (3) (Tent. Draft No. 18, 1972).
54. 292 Pa. 354, 141 A. 231 (1928).

Pennsylvania's adoption of the Uniform Act, a very liberal form of
contribution, and the broad construction it was subsequently afforded. The language of the Uniform Act does not indicate that
the type of tort should be a consideration." Indeed, the Commissioners' Notes to section 2 indicate otherwise.
Nor does [the act] confine contribution to merely negligent
tortfeasors or to those in any other way inadvertently
harming others. It permits contribution among all tortfeasors whom the injured person could hold liable jointly
and severally for the same damage or injury to his person
or property. 56
A state trial court, in Brennis v. Marley,57 followed the Commissioners' Note by not applying the Goldman holding to limit the
Uniform Act and said that "the legislature went beyond the scope
of the decision [Goldman v. Mitchell-Fletcher] as no distinction is
made in the statute between wilful torts and torts arising from negligence." 58 However, in Cage v. New York Central Railroad Co.19, a
United States district court declined to extend contribution under
Pennsylvania's Uniform Act to a wilful and wanton tortfeasor. The
Cage court said that wilful and wanton conduct and intentional
conduct are in the same class since both types imply moral turpitude
on the part of the wrongdoer.60
When a Pennsylvania appellate court is finally confronted with
whether to extend contribution to an intentional or a wilful and
wanton tortfeasor under the Uniform Act it will again be faced with
conflicting policies. The court will have to decide whether to give
more weight to not aiding an intentional tortfeasor whose wrong involves moral turpitude or to enforcing the equitable duty of sharing liability when tortfeasors are in pari delicto.
Since this issue revolves around the type of tortfeasor seeking
contribution, it is significant in view of the issue whether a strictly
liable tortfeasor has a right of contribution from a negligently liable
tortfeasor because that issue too revolves around the type of tortfeasor involved. But as with the questions involving the common liability requirement, a court confronted with either of these issues
will probably adopt a similar approach-that of balancing and comparing the underlying policies.
II.

STRICT LIABILITY

A. Strict Liability and Negligence in Products Liability
Historically, negligence has predominated as the means of com55. PA. STAT. ANN.tit. 12, § 2082.
56. 9 U.L.A. 233 § 1 (1957), Commissioners' Notes.
57. 5 Pa. D. & C.2d 20 (Craw. 1955).
58. Id. at 24. Some of the commentators on Pennsylvania law agree;
see, e.g., 62 DICK. L. REv. 262 (1958); 8A P.L.E. Contribution § 5 (1971);
SUM. PA. JUR. Torts § 645 (1958).
59. 276 F. Supp. 778 (W.D. Pa. 1967), affd per curiam, 386 F.2d 998
(3d Cir. 1967).
60. 276 F. Supp. 778, 791 (W.D. Pa. 1967). Accord, Beavers v. West
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pensation for victims of accidents caused by defective products.0 1
For an individual to be held liable in tort, aside from a determination that his actions actually caused the injury, a finding of fault in
his conduct was necessary. The test of liability has been the actor's fault-usually negligence but sometimes involving a greater
degree of culpability. The fault system was the basis for shifting
the loss from the injured victim to the actor at fault.6 2 The justification for shifting this loss has been that it is beneficial to society to
enforce the moral obligation that the actor at fault has to the injured victim. 63

This moral obligation arose from the belief that as

between these individuals it was fair and just to make the blame4
worthy compensate the blameless.
Strict liability in tort, on the other hand, asserts responsibility
for conduct which is neither intentional nor negligent. Strict liability in the field of products liability is not based on the fault or conduct of an individual but on the condition of the product. 5 That
the defect in the product caused a legally protected interest to be
invaded is the "fault" in strict liability. Unlike negligence, in which
the injured plaintiff as a prerequisite to recovery must sue the seller
who caused the defect, in strict liability the injured person may sue
any seller within the chain of distribution of the product. 66 In negligence, the seller who caused the defect may be unknown, beyond
the jurisdiction of the court or insolvent, but in strict liability the
plaintiff may sue any in a line of sellers, each or all of whom may
be held liable. Also, strict liability rests upon principles of public
policy which, unlike negligence, are not as concerned with liability
between individuals but are oriented more toward benefiting society as a whole and are socially and economically mechanistic.6 7
Penn Power Co., 436 F.2d 869 (3d Cir. 1971).

Those jurisdictions which deny contribution to intentional tortfeasors
reason that a court should not aid an intentional wrongdoer in a cause of

action which is founded on his own wrong and involves moral turpitude.
See Gregory, Contribution Among Tortfeasors: A Uniform Practice, 1938
Wis. L. REV. 365, 367.
61. James, Products Liability, 34 TEXAS L. RaV. 192, 227 (1956).
62. Keeton, Products Liability-The Nature and Extent of Strict Liability, 1964 U. ILL. L.F. 693.
63. Id.
64. James, Social Insurance and Tort Liability: The Problem of Alternative Remedies, 27 N.Y.U. L. REv. 537, 539 (1952).
65. See, e.g., MacDougal v. Ford Motor Co., 214 Pa. Super. 384, 391,
257 A.2d 676, 680 (1965).
66. See, e.g., Forry v. Gulf Oil Corp., 428 Pa. 334, 344, 237 A.2d 593,
597 (1968).
67. Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d
81 (1963). See notes 72-73 and accompanying text infra.

have received recognition as a justificaReasons other than fault
68
tion for shifting losses.
The doctrine of strict liability received approval in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, Section 402A, which states:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his
property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby
caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property,
if

(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such
a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in
which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although (a)
the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation
and sale of his product, and (b) the user or consumer has
not bought the product from or entered into any contractual relation with the seller.
B. Strict Liability in Pennsylvania
In 1966, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Webb v. Zern 0
adopted section 402A as the principle vehicle for recovery in products liability cases and in so doing joined a then growing minority
of ten other jurisdictions. 70 Justice Cohen, speaking for the majority in Webb, adopted as the rationale for the acceptance of section
402A the reasoning expressed in the concurring and dissenting opinions of Justices Jones and Roberts to Miller v. Preitz,71 a decision
rendered the same day as Webb.
In these opinions, Justices Jones and Roberts recognized that
certain social considerations form the basis for strict liability. In imposing upon the suppliers of products this "special responsibility" to
the users and consumers of their products, they gave three reasons. T 2 First, the public's interest in human life, health and safety

demands the maximum protection under the law against defective
products against which the consumer is helpless to protect himself.
Second, the seller by selling these products impliedly assures the
public of the safety of the product. Third, the burden of injuries
caused by product defects should fall upon those who market the
products because of their superior ability to bear the risk and distribute the loss, mainly through their pricing structure. This third
reason is the principal motivation for the adoption of strict liability.7 3 Thus Pennsylvania has joined the trend toward the change
68. See notes 72-73 and accompanying text infra.
69. 422 Pa. 424, 220 A.2d 853 (1966).
70. See note 1 supra.
71. 422 Pa. 383, 398, 221 A.2d 320, 328 (1966) (concurring and dissenting opinion).
72. Id. at 410-11, 419-20, 221 A.2d at 334, 338 (concurring and dissenting opinions).
73. See, e.g., Miller v. Preitz, 422 Pa. 383, 398, 221 A.2d 320, 328 (1966)
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in the nature of tort liability in the products liability field. This
change is the replacement of the individualistic fault principle of
negligence, which shifts the loss because justice and moral responsibility so demand, to the non-fault principle of strict liability, which
shifts the loss to the superior loss distributor because the interests
of society as a whole so demand.
Even though Pennsylvania has adopted strict liability as the
means for recovery in products liability cases, attempts are made to
dilute strict liability with negligence concepts. With only one exception, 4 the Pennsylvania judiciary has refused to shape strict liability in the mold of negligence but instead has been consistent in its
application of the principles of strict liability. 75 In recognizing that
strict liability differs from negligence, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania in Gilbert v. Korvette's Inc.76 said that strict liability was
adopted to correct the deficiencies in the law that had previously
denied plaintiffs' recovery. These deficiencies had arisen when the
plaintiff was unable to prove negligence or qualify under the doctrines of res ipsa loquitur or exclusive control. 77 The superior
court further distinguished negligence from strict liability in MacDougall v. Ford Motor Co. 78 when, in ruling that section 402A actions would be governed by the evidentiary standards of warranty
law rather than negligence, it said:
(concurring and dissenting opinion) stating:
The underlying purpose of section 402(a) is to insure that the
costs of injuries resulting from defective products are borne by the
manufacturers that put such products on the market rather than
by the injured persons who are powerless to protect themselves.
Id. at 410, 221 A.2d at 334. For further support for the proposition that this
third reason is the major reason for the adoption of strict liability, see
Cowan, Some Policy Bases of Products Liability, 17 STAN. L. REV. 1077, 1087
(1965); Keeton, Products Liability-The Nature and Extent of Strict Liability, 1964 U. ILL. L.F. 693, 694; Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel, 69
YALE
1099, 1120 (1960).
1 74.L.J.Oehler
v. Davis, 233 Pa. Super. 333, 298 A.2d 895 (1972). In Oehler, the court, speaking through then Judge Packel, engrafted negligence
concepts onto section 402A, "intermingled holdings as to lack of due care
and legal causation," id. at 342, 298 A.2d at 900 (dissenting opinion), and
"relied upon rules and restrictions having no application to strict prioduct
liability under section 402A as adopted and broadened by our Pennsylvania
courts." Id. at 343, 298 A.2d at 902 (dissenting opinion).
75. [T]he Pennsylvania courts have since adopted and have consistently followed the broad social concepts of Section 402A, which
section does indeed render the manufacturer liable for a defective
product regardless of its lack of negligence ...
Salvador v. I.H. English of Phila., Inc., 224 Pa. Super. 377, 380, 307 A.2d
398, 400 (1973).
76. 223 Pa. Super. 359, 299 A.2d 356 (1972).
77. Id. at 366 n.4, 299 A.2d at 360 n.4.
78. 214 Pa. Super. 384, 257 A.2d 676 (1969).

The evidentiary requirements of negligence law demand proof that injury is proximately caused by a specific
defect in design or construction because liability hinges
upon whether the accident could have been avoided by the
exercise of reasonable care. In contrast, the concern of
both section 402A and warranty law is with the fitness of
the product,7 9not the conduct of the producer as measured
by due care.

In addition, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reiterated its commitment to the "better risk bearer" principle underlying section
402A in Bialek v. PittsburghBrewing Co.80 There the defendant argued that the plaintiff was required to show which seller under
section 402A in the distributive chain caused the defect. The court
rejected this, stating that to adopt the defendant's argument would
be reverting "to fault as the basis of liability."81
It is readily apparent, therefore, that Pennsylvania has shown
its willingness to reject the principles of negligence in favor of those
of strict liability in products liability cases. However, the decisions
just reviewed concerned actions between the injured consumer and
the product's seller. Whether, once the injured consumer is compensated, the principles of strict liability should be dropped in the
ensuing controversy between the defendants to the action is another
question. This conflict comes into focus when the third party controversy, either an indemnity or contribution action, is between a
person liable in strict liability and a person liable in negligence.
One way to test whether a state has fully accepted the philosophy
and the social and economic implications of strict liability is to
examine a third-party conflict between two such defendants. The
Pennsylvania courts have been faced only once with such a situation and that was an indemnity action. 82 Otherwise only the courts
in Illinois and Washington have had indemnity cases involving this
issue.88 The following section is an examination of these decisions.
C. Effect of Strict Liability on Actions Between Tortfeasors
Indemnity and contribution are corollaries of the fault principle
in tort law and have developed as subordinate aspects of fault-based
liability.8 4 Both allocate the loss between the tortfeasors who
79. Id. at 391, 257 A.2d at 680. Accord, Greco v. Bucciconi Eng'r Co.,

283 F. Supp. 978 (W.D. Pa. 1967), aff'd, 407 F.2d 87 (3d Cir. 1969).
80. 430 Pa. 176, 242 A.2d 231 (1968).
81. Id. at 187 n.2, 242 A.2d at 236 n.2.
82. Mixter v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 224 Pa. Super. 313, 308 A.2d 139
(1973).
83. See notes 87-94 and 95-98 and accompanying text infra.
84. James, Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors: A Pragmatic Criticism, 54 HARv. L. REv. 1156, 1171 (1941); James Indemnity, Subrogation, and
Contributionand The Efficient Distribution of Accident Losses, 21 NACCA
L.J. 360 (1958); Keeton, Products Liability-The Nature and Extent of
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caused the injury and who, in negligence terminology, were at fault.
This, however, conflicts with the policy of strict liability which allocates and distributes the loss in the most socially desirable manner regardless of fault. In a suit which involves a conflict between
two strictly liable persons in either indemnity or contribution, any
result will be in concurrence with the social principles of section
402A since both are sellers and presumably superior loss distributors.85 In indemnity and contribution suits involving a person liable
in strict liability and a person liable in negligence, on the other
hand, the loss distribution principles of contribution and indemnity
conflict with those of strict liability. This clash in principles was
put most aptly by a commentator who said:
The values underlying the notion of equal protection
or fairness

. . .

support contribution.

The notion that like

classes should be treated alike opts for treating similarly
those whose actions are equally responsible for injury. But
when are parties 'equally responsible' and for what purpose? Although each tortfeasor's conduct may have been
equally a cause for 'cause in fact' purposes, and equally
a cause for 'proximate cause' purposes when the victim asserts liability, they may not be equally deterable, or equally
able to spread losses, or equally able to associate losses with
products.80

In Suvada v. White Motor Co.,8 7 the Supreme Court of Illinois
reshaped the concept of indemnity in view of its adoption of strict
liability. Plaintiffs in Suvada had purchased a used but reconditioned tractor unit from White Motor Co. The brake system for
the tractor was manufactured by Bendix but installed by White.
While driving the tractor, the brakes failed and plaintiffs collided
with a bus, injuring a number of passengers. Plaintiffs settled all
the personal injury claims and filed an action against White and
Bendix for indemnity. Bendix, which was strictly liable as a component part manufacturer, argued that the plaintiffs were not entitled
to indemnification. The plaintiffs were actively and primarily negligent, Bendix argued, and so there could be no indemnity. 8 In its
rejection of this contention, the court held that plaintiffs' negligence did not prevent indemnification from one strictly liable and
reasoned that it would be the antithesis of strict liability to weigh
the fault of each party involved.
Strict Liability, 1964 U. ILL. L.F. 693; Note, The Right to Indemnity in Products Liability Cases, 1964 U. ILL. L.F. 614, 630; 49 MARQ. L. Rzv. 467, 470
(1965).
85. See notes 16-17 and accompanying text supra.
86. Comment, The Allocation of Loss Among Joint Tortfeasors, 41 S.
CAL. L. REv. 728, 736 (1968).

87.
88.

32 Ill. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965).
See note 15 supra.

The Suvada decision opened a new theory of indemnity between tortfeasors in Illinois by permitting the negligent user of a
defective product to shift the entire legal obligation back to the
manufacturer and seller of the defective product.8 9 By the Suvada
doctrine, indemnity is not limited to those who are personally free
from fault but is granted simply because of the social and economic
considerations of strict liability which call for the distribution of
the loss by those best able to distribute it. That policy requires, in
the court's apparent view, that the indemnitee's fault be judiciously
ignored. 0
The Appellate Court of Illinois in Texaco, Inc. v. McGrew Lumber Co. 9' followed those principles established in Suvada in another
indemnity action between a negligent defendant seeking indemnity
from one strictly liable. Again the strictly liable defendant argued
that the indemnitee's active negligence must preclude indemnification. The court, holding that the rationale and policy underpinnings of strict liability allow indemnity in this situation, said that
Suvada "manifests a strong public policy that insists upon the distribution of the economic burden in the most socially desirable man92
ner, even to the extent of ignoring the indemnitee's fault."
In a recent case, the Appellate Court of Illinois was faced with
a situation similar to Suvada and Texaco except that a strictly
liable seller was seeking indemnity from a negligent defendant.
In Burke v. Sky Climber, Inc.,93 plaintiff brought an action in strict
liability against the manufacturer of a defective scaffold which allegedly caused the decedent's death. Sky Climber, the manufacturer, appealed the dismissal of its third-party action against the decedent's employer for indemnity. Sky Climber alleged that the employer was guilty of independent acts of primary and active negligence. In denying the appeal, the court again chose to ignore active
negligence to the detriment of one strictly liable. As in Texaco
and Suvada, the court's reasoning highlighted the impact that the social policy considerations of strict liability may have on third-party
actions: "In our opinion, the basic underlying reasons of policy as
expressed in Suvada should be operative here to prevent this type
94
of indemnity.
89. For an excellent discussion of this aspect of Suvada, see 49 MMIQ.
L. REV. 467 (1965).
90. Accord, Fulton Insur. Co. v. White Motor Corp., 261 Ore. 206, 493
P.2d 138 (1972).
91. 117 Ill. App. 2d 351, 254 N.E.2d 584 (1969).
92. Id. at 358, 254 N.E.2d at 588.
93. 13 Ill. App. 3d 498, 301 N.E.2d 41 (1973).
94. Id. at 504, 301 N.E.2d at 46. In Suvada, the Supreme Court of Illinois in its acceptance of strict liability expressed reasons similar for this
adoption to those expressed by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania when
it adopted strict liability. Compare Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d
612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965) with Miller v. Preitz, 422 Pa. 383, 398, 221 A.2d
320, 328 (1966) (concurring and dissenting opinion).
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Illinois' application of the policy considerations of strict liability
to this type of indemnity action was rebuked by the Court of Appeals of Washington in Northwestern Mutual Insurance Co. v.
Stromme.95 In Northwestern, Blacklaw, while driving an automobile, struck and killed a road construction laborer whose estate was
awarded a judgment for Blacklaw's negligence. Blacklaw then
sought indemnity from the seller and manufacturer of her automobile alleging that the automobile's defective brakes were the primary cause of the accident. Although Blacklaw was actively negligent, 96 she still argued that she was entitled to indemnity because
the defendants were strictly liable.
The court's reasoning in Northwestern presents a sharp contrast to that used by the Illinois courts. 9 7 While the Illinois courts
applied the policies underlying strict liability not only to a suit involving compensation for the injured person but also to a thirdparty action involving the tortfeasors, the Northwestern court ignored these policies and reasoned in terms of fault.
Washington's recent adoption of strict liability as a basis
for tort action against a manufacturer does not, of itself,
raise the tortfeasor's liability thereunder to a higher plateau or degree than the user's liability which stems from
the use of the product causing the injury; nor does it
change our indemnity law pertaining to joint tortfeasors.
The facts surrounding the incident giving rise to the initial
cause of action and the duties breached by the tortfeasors
determine whether indemnity will be permitted, not the
theory upon which their liability may be based. 8
Recently, the Pennsylvania Superior Court handed down a decision which involved a third-party indemnity action between a defendant liable in strict liability and a defendant liable in negligence.
In Mixter v. Mack Trucks, Inc.,99 plaintiff purchased a used
Mack tractor from defendant Mack. Prior to the sale, Mack
purchased new tires and tubes for the tractors from Montgomery
Ward, which installed the new tires and tubes on the old rim assembly. While working on the tractor, plaintiff was injured when
the tire and rim assembly exploded. Plaintiff sued Mack alleging
that the rim assembly was defective; Mack joined Montgomery
Ward as an additional defendant demanding indemnity and alleg95. 4 Wash. App. 85, 479 P.2d 554 (1971).
96. The facts involving the litigation of the negligence issue are presented in Curtis v. Blacklaw, 66 Wash. 2d 484, 403 P.2d 358 (1965).
97. See notes 87-94 and accompanying text supra.
98. Northwestern Mutual Insur. Co. v. Stromme, 4 Wash. App. 85, 88,
479 P.2d 554, 556 (1971).
99. 224 Pa. Super. 313, 308 A.2d 139 (1973).

big that any defect was caused or concealed by Ward. The case
was submitted to the jury on the strict liability of Mack and the
negligence of Montgomery Ward. The jury found against both and
the trial court granted indemnity over to Mack from Montgomery
Ward. On appeal the superior court affirmed.
Whether the superior court refused to follow the Illinois
court's approach and instead accepted the Washington court's approach is unclear. The Mixter court neither cited any of these decisions nor addressed itself to the conflict between policies. The
situations facing the Illinois and Washington courts, however, are
distinguishable from the situation facing the Mixter court. The
former involved negligent users and consumers whose acts, independent of the defective product, contributed to the injury and
who, if injured, might have fallen into the class of plaintiffs protected by section 402A. The latter did not involve this type of
negligent defendant. Ward was the seller of the tires and tubes
and was originally charged with strict liability. The count in strict
liability, however, was dropped because of a lack of evidence and
Ward was found liable for the negligent installation of the tires.
Ward, although not technically a member of the chain of distribution as a seller under section 402A, did nevertheless aid in the
manufacture of a defective product. Additionally, Ward's negligence
was directly connected to the manufacturing process, not independent. Apparently the court viewed Ward's role as that of a component part manufacturer. Citing Burbage v. Boiler Engineering &
Supply Co.,100 an indemnity action between a strictly liable manufacturer and a strictly liable component part manufacturer, and
Tromza v. Tecumseh Products Co.,101 an indemnity action between
a negligent manufacturer and a negligent component part manufacturer, the court treated both defendants' liability as if they
were the same type. The only conclusion that can be drawn
is that the Pennsylvania courts have not as yet been faced
with a situation in which they have had to choose between
the approaches taken by Illinois and Washington. They have not
yet been confronted with the opportunity to decide whether the
principles of strict liability will be applicable to third party actions
involving a negligent defendant and a strictly liable defendant.

III. FEDERAL COURT DECISIONS
Of the six cases arising under Pennsylvania law that have considered whether there is a right of contribution between one liable
under strict liability and one liable in negligence, all have been
decided by the federal courts in the third circuit.' 0 2 Since no Penn100.
101.
102.

433 Pa. 319, 249 A.2d 563 (1969).
378 F.2d 601 (3d Cir. 1967).
See note 2 supra.
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sylvania appellate courts have as yet been faced with this issue,
and because their jurisdiction was predicated upon diversity, these
federal decisions are only predictions of how the Pennsylvania
courts will decide the same issue. As has been demonstrated, the
Pennsylvania judiciary has been afforded far more opportunity to
develop the law in the area of contribution than in the area of
strict products liability: contribution has been in effect in Pennsylvania since 1928 but strict liability has been in effect only since
1966. Hence an analysis of these federal decisions will more fully
reveal whether the federal courts approached the issue as the Pennsylvania judiciary would have in the contribution situation rather
10 3
than as they would have in the strict liability situation.
A. Fenton v. McCrory Corp.
Fenton v. McCrory Corp.104 was the first decision on the strict
liability-negligence dichotomy in contribution. There, plaintiff
was a minor who had purchased a toy bow-and-arrow set at defendant's store. This bow-and-arrow set was marketed as containing
safety arrows because a small rubber suction cup was attached to
the leading end of each arrow shaft. The arrows were defective because repeated shooting against hard surfaces was shown to wear
out the suction cup and expose the shaft. While playing with the
bow-and-arrow set a few days after the purchase, a playmate shot
an arrow toward the plaintiff and struck him in the eye. Plaintiff
lost the sight of his eye and filed suit against defendant-retailer
claiming that defendant was strictly liable since he was the seller of
the defective bow-and-arrow set which caused the injury. Defendant joined as a third-party defendant the playmate, alleging that
the playmate's negligence made him a joint tortfeasor and entitled
defendant to a right of contribution.' 0 5
The third-party defendant moved to dismiss the third-party
complaint contending that there is no right of contribution between
a party strictly liable and a party negligently liable. In dismissing
the third-party complaint, District Judge Weber held that contribution exists only between negligent tortfeasors. An examination of
103.

Only five of these decisions will be discussed since the sixth, W.D.

Rubright Co. v. International Harvester, 358 F. Supp. 1388 (W.D. Pa. 1973),

does not add anything to the discussion of the other decisions; Rubright will
be referred to in the footnotes.
104. 47 F.R.D. 260 (W.D. Pa. 1969).
105. Failing in the action for contribution, McCrory later sought indemnification from Girard Rubber Corp., the manufacturer of the rubber
suction cups, as a component part manufacturer. That suit is still pending:
see McCrory Corp. v. Girard Rubber Corp., 225 Pa. Super. 45, 307 A.2d 435

(1973).

the history of the development of the doctrine of contribution in
Pennsylvania, the court reasoned, demonstrates that there is no
right to contribution "between those whose liability is imposed
under different grounds."' 1 6 What followed this statement, however, was not a comparison of the underlying policies of strict liability and contribution but instead a citation to an earlier decision
10 7
of Judge Weber's--Cage v. New York Central Railroad Co.,

which held that a wilful and wanton tortfeasor had no right of contribution from a negligent tortfeasor. With this citation, the court
abruptly ended the discussion of its holding.
A more exemplary factual situation with which to demonstrate
the clash between strict liability and contribution could not have
been created. However, the court merely made reference to section 402A because Pennsylvania had adopted it and discussed contribution in Pennsylvania by way of conclusion.' 0 8 Absent the
court's reasoning, the decision is consistent with the doctrine of
strict liability. If a judgment for contribution had been entered
against the third-party defendant, a poorer loss distributor than a
minor could not have been found. In addition, the third-party defendant was a user of the product and hence a member of the class
that section 402A was designed to protect. On the other hand, the
court's decision is in conflict with the approach Pennsylvania has
adopted toward contribution: as between the individuals who contributed to the same injury, it is only fair and just to enforce the
right to contribution.
The reasoning in Fenton did not establish a firm foundation
upon which future litigants could stand. As will be seen, the Fenton court's rather tenuous analogy of the strict liability-negligence
dichotomy to the wilful and wanton-negligence dichotomy allowed the courts that later confronted the same issue latitude to
criticize and reject this holding. 0 9 Perhaps the Fenton decision
might have been a stronger authority if the court had eliminated
its citation to Cage v. New York Central Railroad Co. The ambiguity which would have resulted might have forced the courts that
considered the same issue after Fenton to come to grips with the
implications of the Fenton decision.
B.

Walters v. Hiab Hydraulics, Inc.

In Walters v. Hiab Hydraulics, Inc.,n 0 plaintiff's decedent was
electrocuted when the Hiab speedloader with which he was erecting roof trusses came into contact with some overhead electric
wires. Plaintiff -brought a wrongful death and survival action
106.
107.
(3d Cir.
108.
109.
110.

47 F.R.D. 260, 262 (W.D. Pa. 1969).
276 F. Supp. 778 (W.D. Pa. 1967), aff'd per curiam, 386 F.2d 998
1967). See notes 59-60 and accompanying text supra.
See Fenton v. McCrory Corp., 47 F.R.D. 260, 262 (W.D. Pa. 1969).
See text accompanying notes 114 and 124 infra.
356 F. Supp. 1000 (M.D. Pa. 1973).
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against Hiab Hydraulics under the theory of strict liability alleging that the hydraulic lift was defective because it lacked the necessary insulation against electrical hazards. After a series of pretrial motions, Ateco Equipment Company was joined as a thirdparty defendant under a section 402A theory; the owner of the
farm where the accident occurred was joined as a fourth-party defendant under a negligence theory; the public utility who owned
the electrical wires was joined as a fifth-party defendant under a
negligence theory; the decedent's employer was brought in on a
crossclaim under a negligence theory.
The parties whose alleged liability was in negligence filed motions to dismiss the complaints filed against them and in support
of their motions relied upon Fenton. In rejecting this reliance,
the court did not attempt to distinguish Fenton:
Contrary to the court's prediction in Fenton, it is my prediction that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania would
adopt the principle that there exists a right of contribution
in favor of one liable to a Plaintiff under the strict liability
theory of § 402A from one liable to the same Plaintiff under
a negligence theory.11
In its criticism of Fenton, the Walters court attacked the weak
link in the Fenton court's reasoning-Cage v. New York Central
Railroad Co. However, while rejecting the application of Cage to
the contention that there can be no contribution between tortfeasors whose liability is based upon different grounds, the court cited
Cage to support the foundation of its reasoning. Those arguing
against the granting of the motions contended that the court should
hold that there is a right of contribution in this situation based
upon a construction of the literal language in Pennsylvania's Uniform Act. 1 12 They asserted that the Uniform Act makes no mention of any particular type of tort liability and, since the defendants were joint tortfeasors, under the Act 1 13 contribution is available. Rejecting this contention, the court cited Cage in regard to its
implication, that the Pennsylvania courts would not automatically
grant contribution under the Uniform Act upon a finding of joint
liability, but instead would consider each type of case independently when deciding the right of contribution.
In rejecting the Fenton court's use of Cage to support its conclusion that contribution is not available to those whose liability is
predicated upon different grounds, the Walters court distinguished
111. Id. at 1002.
112. Brief for Ateco Equip. Co. at 3-4, Walters v. Hiab Hydraulics, Inc.,
356 F. Supp. 1000 (M.D. Pa. 1973). See note 55 and accompanying text supra.
113. See note 10 and accompanying text supra.

between strict liability and wilful and wanton liability."" The
court pointed out that the reason contribution is unavailable to a
wilful and wanton wrongdoer is that courts have consistently refused to aid intentional wrongdoers, and wilful and wanton acts
are similar to intentional acts because they both imply moral turpitude. 115 There is no implication of moral turpitude, the court noted,
on the part of one strictly liable.
In support of the motion to dismiss the complaints, the court
was urged that to hold that the right of contribution is not available in this type of situation would be "in keeping with the intent
of the Restatement of Torts, § 402A [that] the manufacturer of
products must bear the entire loss even though there is negligence
on the part of others in bringing about such loss."'11 In rejecting
this contention, Judge Muir directly addressed the application of
the social and economic policies of section 402A to third-party situations. 17 After reviewing the policy reasons given for the adoption
of section 402A by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, Judge Muir
reasoned that these policy considerations are for the protection of
the injured consumer and not for the protection of an uninjured
third-party whose negligence contributed to the plaintiff's injury.
To support this conclusion the court cited Duckworth v. Ford Motor Co.,"18 a products liability decision in which the manufacturer
was granted contribution from a negligent third-party. Duckworth,
however, was decided prior to the adoption of strict liability in Pennsylvania; the manufacturer was liable in negligence. The court
noted this distinction but found no inconsistency in its reasoning.
In conclusion the court said: "To hold the right to contribution no
longer exists would be an extension of the strict liability concept
19
beyond the policy considerations upon which 402A is founded."'
The Walters decision is significant not only because in rejecting Fenton it was willing to permit contribution but also because of
By deciding
its interpretation of strict liability in Pennsylvania.
that the policy considerations of strict liability do not affect actions
for contribution in which a negligent tortfeasor is also involved, the
court strictly construed section 402A in Pennsylvania. In the
court's view, Pennsylvania's acceptance of section 402A does not affect actions between tortfeasors-a view the Illinois courts refused
to accept. 20 In reaching this interpretation, however, the court did
not balance the policies underlying contribution and strict liability.
Indeed, the court never mentioned the equitable considerations of
114. Accord, W.D. Rubright Co. v. International Harvester Co., 358 F.
Supp. 1388 (W.D. Pa. 1973).
115. See note 60 and accompanying text supra.
116. Reply Brief for fourth-party defendant at 3-4, Walters v. Hiab Hydraulics, Inc., 356 F. Supp. 1000 (M.D. Pa. 1973).
117. Compare text with note 108 and accompanying text supra.
118. 320 F.2d 130 (3d Cir. 1963).
119. 356 F. Supp. 1000, 1003 (M.D. Pa. 1973).
120. See notes 87-94 and accompanying text supra.
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contribution, a significant deviation from the approach usually
12 1
taken by the Pennsylvania courts to contribution suits.

C.

Chamberlainv. CarborundumCo.

In May of 1972 District Judge Sorg held, in the unreported decision of Chamberlain v. Carborundum Co., 122 that a right of contribution exists between a strictly liable tortfeasor and a negligent
tortfeasor. In the course of his employment with Berwind Railway
Service Company, Chamberlain was fatally injured while operating a portable grinding wheel. The grinder was equipped with an
abrasive wheel which had been manufactured and sold by Carborundum Company to Berwind but this grinder was not equipped
with a safety-guard. The wheel fractured and a fragment pierced
his abdomen causing Chamberlain's death. Plaintiff, Chamberlain's administratix, sued the manufacturer in a survival and
wrongful death action on the theory of strict liability. Carborundum joined the employer as a third-party defendant alleging that
its negligence in failing to provide a guard on its grinding wheel
made Berwind liable to Carborundum for contribution. In a special verdict, the jury awarded plaintiff damages. In addition, the
jury found that Carborundum was strictly liable and that Berwind's negligence was a proximate cause of the injury. In his
judgment on the verdict in favor of plaintiff, Judge Sorg also ordered that judgment be entered for contribution in an amount not
to exceed one-half of the damages awarded minus the workmen's
compensation payments made to date and limited to an amount not
to exceed Berwind's liability for future workmen's compensation
payments. 123
After entry of judgment, the employer moved to amend the
judgment, contending that as between a manufacturer liable on a
strict liability theory and an employer liable for negligence there
is no right to contribution. As in Walters, the court found that a
right of contribution exists. There is, however, an interesting contrast between the reasoning presented in Walters and that presented by Judge Sorg. Although not even mentioning the Fenton
decision, which was the only relevant decision at that time, Judge
Sorg distinguished Cage from the issue before the court. Unlike
the court in Walters, the district court did not discuss the applicability of the policy considerations of strict liability but instead dis121. See notes 35-36 and accompanying text supra.
122. Civil No. 68-1235 (W.D. Pa., May 19, 1972).
123. See note 50 and accompanying text supra.

cussed the equitable considerations of contribution. Along this
line, the court said that contribution is intended to relieve tortfeasors of injustice among themselves and to achieve a sharing of
124
common responsibility according to natural justice and equity.
On appeal, the court of appeals not only affirmed the district
court's decision but also resolved the conflicting decisions of
125
Fenton, Walters and the district court decision in Chamberlain.
Moreover, the approach adopted by the court of appeals is strikingly similar to that developed by the Pennsylvania appellate courts
in their contribution decisions. To establish the foundation of its
reasoning, the court of appeals began by saying that contribution
between tortfeasors should not be approached as recovery for the
tort itself but as the enforcement of the equitable duty to share liability for the injury. 12 6 The court then applied this concept to the
issue before it:
That in Carborundum's case the law imposes an absolute
duty of care to manufacture a nondefective product, while
in Berwind's case the law imposes only the standard of reasonable care seems to us quite irrelevant. Relevant is the
conjunction of defective127 performances of both duties, which
produced the accident.
In other words, to the court of appeals, whether the tort was in
negligence or in strict liability was of no moment; the major concern was the tortious acts which produced the injury.
The appellant, the negligent employer, urged the court to consider the difference between the principles upon which strict liability and negligence are premised. In support of this contention, appellants noted Justice Jones' language in his concurring and dissenting opinion to Miller v. Preitz"28 in which he said that strict liability is a special responsibility and as a result, the burden of injuries caused by defective products should fall upon the sellers of
these products. 129 Allowing a manufacturer of a defective product
contribution from a negligent tortfeasor, appellants urged, would
be inconsistent with the policies underlying Pennsylvania's adop124. Civil No. 68-1235 at 4 (W.D. Pa., May 19, 1972). The court in W.D.
Rubright Co. v. International Harvester Co., 358 F. Supp. 1388 (W.D. Pa.
1973) also adopted this approach:
[Pennsylvania's Uniform Act] embodies a policy which favors
spreading the cost of compensating an injured party for his injuries
among the parties who cause those injuries. The general application of this policy serves the best interests of justice.
Id. at 1400.
125. Chamberlain v. Carborundum Co., 485 F.2d 31 (3d Cir. 1973).
126. See notes 35-36 and accompanying text supra.
127. 485 F.2d 31, 34 (3d Cir. 1973). See note 98 and accompanying text

supra.

128. 422 Pa. 398, 221 A.2d 328 (1966) (concurring and dissenting opinion). See notes 71-72 and accompanying text supra.
129. Id. at 411-12, 221 A.2d at 334-35 (concurring and dissenting opinion).
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tion of strict liability, and would dilute the manufacturer's special
responsibility.'20
To accept the rationale of this argument, the court of appeals
held, would be to read the Pennsylvania cases as adopting section
402A as not only eliminating the necessity for proof of the manufacturer's negligence but also "of adopting a major shift in the burden
of reparations in product personal injury cases by relieving negligent third parties of the burden of making contribution."' 131 Like
the district court in Walters, the court of appeals strictly construed section 402A in Pennsylvania by holding that the policy considerations underlying strict liability do not justify its extension to
third-party actions. 13 2 However, whereas the court in Walters
vaguely discussed its rationale for this limitation on section 402A,
reasoning only that strict liability is for the protection of consumers
and not for negligent third parties, the court of appeals specifically
rejected the principal policy underlying strict liability, that the bur1 33
den of loss should be borne by those who can best distribute it,
as applied to contribution actions.
The court of appeals, unlike the Walters court, contrasted the
policies underlying strict liability against those underlying contribution. In this approach the court followed the model established
by the Pennsylvania appellate courts in their contribution decisions
134
involving common liability.
D. Rhoads v. Ford Motor Co.
However, for the federal courts Chamberlain did not entirely
resolve the issue. In April of 1974, just seven months after Chamberlain, it was held in Rhoads v. Ford Motor Co.13 5 that a strictly
liable manufacturer was not entitled to contribution from a negligent tortfeasor. Interestingly, Rhoads was decided by Judge Sorg,
the judge who also decided Chamberlain at the district court level.
In Rhoads, Rhoads and his wife were involved in an automobile
accident in which his wife was killed. As the administrator of her
estate, Rhoads brought a wrongful death and survival action
against Ford Motor Company, the manufacturer of the auto, under
a strict liability theory alleging that a defective steering mechan130.
rundum
131.
supra.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Brief for Berwind Ry. Service Co. at 6-8, Chamberlain v. CarboCo., 485 F.2d 31 (3d Cir. 1973).
485 F.2d 31, 34 (3d Cir. 1973). See note 98 and accompanying text
See note 120 and accompanying text supra.
See notes 72-73 and accompanying text supra.
See notes 35-46 and accompanying text supra.
374 F. Supp. 1317 (W.D. Pa. 1974).

ism caused the accident. Ford then joined Rhoads as a third-party
defendant alleging negligence because of his reckless driving and
seeking contribution. However, although the jury found Ford
strictly liable and Rhoads negligent, the court found in favor of
Rhoads as a third-party defendant.
The Rhoads decision rests upon the proposition that contribution is available only to joint tortfeasors in pari delicto, or of equal
fault, and that to be in pari delicto the joint tortfeasors must first
be in aequali juri, or of equal status or right. 13 6 The Rhoads court
reasoned that the underlying social principles of strict liability require that the seller-protector (strictly liable manufacturer) and
the protected user (negligent tortfeasor) not be treated as in aequali juri. Thus, since Ford and Rhoads are not in aequali juri,
there can be no contribution.
To distinguish its decision in Chamberlain, the court stated
that there the tortfeasors had "parallel duties"1 37 which "rendered
them in aequali juri.'1 38 These parallel duties arose from the manufacturer's strict liability and the state safety regulation in regard
to the guard for the employer's grinder. The court concluded that
the tortfeasors in Chamberlain were thus in pari delicto and because of this finding the seller-protector and protected user distinction was not applicable:
It must be noted, however, that Chamberlainpremises the
of the parties deissue of contribution on the par delictumn
13 9
hors the seller-purchaser incidence.
In view of the social policies underlying strict liability, the
Rhoads court's treatment of the issue is consistent, 140 and it is sim4
ilar to the treatment accorded third-party actions in Illinois.1 '
However, the question remains as to its consistency with the Chamberlain decision.
Both Rhoads and Chamberlain were decided by special verdicts
with almost identical interrogatories submitted to the jury. 42 In
both cases the jury was asked whether there was any negligence on
the part of the third-party defendant which was a proximate cause
of the accident; in both cases the answer was affirmative. In
Chamberlain this interrogatory was the basis of the finding of
negligence on the third-party defendant's part and there was no
discussion of any per se negligence due to a violation of a state
136. The Rhoads court made this statement without citation to any authority, see 374 F. Supp. at 1321, and it is a proposition not found in any
of the research by the author of this Comment.
137. 374 F. Supp. at 1320.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. See text accompanying notes 108, 116-17 and 128-30 supra.
141. See text accompanying notes 87-94 supra.
142. See Rhoads v. Ford Motor Co., 374 F. Supp. 1317, 1318 (W.D. Pa.
1974); Chamberlain v. Carborundum Co., Civil No. 68-1235 at 2 (W.D. Pa.
May 19, 1972).
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safety regulation. Thus in both Chamberlain and Rhoads the same
duties were involved-the common law duty not to cause injury
through negligent conduct. It is difficult to see how the thirdparty defendant's duty to Chamberlain was any different from that
of the third-party defendant in Rhoads.
Furthermore, the court of appeals in Chamberlain clearly indicated that its decision as to whether a strictly liable tortfeasor is entitled to contribution from a negligent tortfeasor was to resolve the
conflict between the district court decisions in Chamberlain, Wal14
ters v. Hiab Hydraulics, Inc. and Fenton v. McCrory Corp.
Therefore, the appellate decision in Chamberlain can be viewed as
precedent setting in that it controls subsequent cases involving similar factual situations. All of the above discussed cases involved a
negligent user or purchaser and a strictly liable seller whose derelictions of duty concurrently caused a single injury. It would thus
appear that the Rhoads decision is not distinguishable from Chamberlain.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Pennsylvania's acceptance of the doctrine of contribution is
nothing extraordinary, thirty-five states have done likewise. The
form of contribution adopted, however, is very important because
some forms are more limited than others, both procedurally and
substantively. Not only has Pennsylvania enacted the Uniform
Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, an act recognized as allowing contribution in its broadest sense, but its courts have construed
it liberally in comparison with the other states that have adopted
similar statutes.
An examination of the Pennsylvania products liability decisions
involving strict liability shows that Pennsylvania has not only rejected negligence and its underpinnings of "fault" in favor of strict
liability but also accepted strict liability's underlying social policies,
especially its "better risk bearer" principle. But whether strict
liability will influence the outcome of a third-party action between
a strictly liable tortfeasor and a negligently liable tortfeasor any
differently from that between two negligently liable tortfeasors is
an issue the Pennsylvania apppellate courts have not yet faced.
This Comment has examined this issue in the context of contribution. Contribution, as a corollary of negligence, presents a
conflict between its underlying policies and those of strict liability.
143.

Chamberlain v. Carborundum Co., 485 F.2d 31, 32 (3d Cir. 1973).

In Chamberlainv. Carborundum,144 the court of appeals, in addition
-to resolving differing district court decisions 14" on this issue, approached the issue in a manner similar to the approach developed
by the Pennsylvania appellate courts in their contribution decisions.
This decision, allowing contribution between a strictly liable tortfeasor and a negligently liable tortfeasor, will probably be followed
by a Pennsylvania appellate court when faced with the same issue
because Pennsylvania so strongly favors contribution. But if Pennsylvania claims to have adopted strict liability and all of its social
policies in products liability cases, then a result consistent with this
would be to deny contribution to a strictly liable tortfeasor when it
is sought from a negligently liable tortfeasor.
DANEL B. HuYETT

144.
145.

485 F.2d 31 (3d Cir. 1973).
See note 2 supra.

